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4 September/1958

## HIGHEST PRIORITY TARGETS FOR PERIPHERAL PHOTOGRAPHY

- The Ad Hoc Requirements Committee (ARC) has previously expressed to the Project its views on the need for oblique photography on the periphery of the Soviet Union (see the recapitulation in Tab G).
- Inasmuch as coverage of highest priority fargets in the USSR which require penetration cannot be covered for lack of permission from highest US authority, the ARC has reconsidered the need for oblique photography of the Soviet periphery. It sets forth below its recommendations for such peripheral coverage in order of priority and with attachments pertaining to each area listed indicating the evidence which causes concern and assessing the probabilities for collecting useful and possibly critical information, In submitting these views, the ARC wishes to reaffirm that the highest priority targets already transmitted to the Project remain highest and that it would not wish to see the peripheral coverage herein recommended if indeed such efforts were to jeopardize achievement of the major goals.
- The ARC has selected for recommended coverage those areas on the periphery of the Soviet Union in which are known or suspected missile installations, in possibly varying stages of construction or completed. Photography by the B oblique at a maximum distance of 20 miles will permit recognition of a number of these installations and activities relating thereto though probably will not permit detailed technical photo interpretation in all cases. These areas are chosen with regard to the likelihood of identifying by peripheral coverage positive or negative evidence of Soviet accomplishments in their guided missile programs. We have in mind current estimates of present Soviet capabilities, i.e., poperational deployment of guided missile configured submarines and initiation of construction of launch sites for, if not actual deployment of, land based surface-to-surface missile systems; the shorter the range, the greater the probability of operational readiness.

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4. The target areas recommended are as follows:

## Priority One:

- a. BARENTS Sea (coast line from the Finnish border to PONOJ).
- b. PETROPAVLOVSK area.

## Priority Two:

- c. Coastal region immediately above and below BUKHTA-UGOL'NAYA (Tab C).
  - d. VLADIVOSTOK and vicinity (Tab E).
  - e. The BLACK Sea coast line (Tab D).

We wish to emphasize that the foregoing priorities are specifically established as relating to oblique photography -- not involving penetration. They take into account our appraisal of the importance of the target area along with anticipated return of information by oblique photography as well as coast line configurations and the season of the year. Attention is called to the importance of covering areas in the northern latitudes before the sun angle gets too low.

- 5. The ARC has also carefully examined the northern periphery of USSR in terms of whether information collected by oblique photography is sufficient to rate any portion of it with the foregoing priorities. The best case that can be made is in the area of TIKSI (the detailed examination of this is set forth as Tab F). It is the view of the ARC that this does not rate in the same priority with those listed.
- 6. The ARC believes, particularly after examining a photographic exhibit prepared from Mission 6012 (coverage of the CHICOM Coast), that the possibilities of securing valuable and possibly critical intelligence information from pursuing a peripheral photographic program are greater today than when its views were expressed initially. This appears to be principally

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	7. The ARC fo	eels that if the US has a	capability to collect against	
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	is an equal or better c	apability than CHALICE	it urges that such be employ	,02
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	JAMES Q. REBER			
	Chairman  Ad Hoc Requirements Committee			
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